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Clinical judgements: Research and practice
IAN BELL & DAVID MELLOR
School of Psychology, Deakin University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
Abstract
This paper explores issues that are relevant to the judgements routinely made by clinical psychologists. It first considers the
relative merits of clinical and statistical approaches to decision making and notes that although much of the empirical
evidence demonstrates the greater accuracy of statistical approaches to making judgements (where appropriate methods
exist), they are rarely routinely used. Instead, clinical approaches to making judgements continue to dominate in the majority
of clinical settings. Second, common sources of errors in clinical judgement are reviewed, including the misuse of heuristics,
clinician biases, the limitations of human information-processing capacities, and the overreliance on clinical interviews.
Finally, some of the basic strategies that can be useful to clinicians in improving the accuracy of clinical judgement are
described. These include advanced level training programs, using quality instruments and procedures, being wary of
overreliance on theories, adhering to the scientist–practitioner approach, and being selective in the distribution of
professional efforts and time.
Key words: Clinical judgement, errors in judgement, improving clinical judgement.
Clinical judgements are made by mental health
professionals many times during patients’ contacts
with psychiatric services. Such judgements are
central to formulating the characteristics of the
presenting problem in its context, in predicting
long-term prognoses, in guiding the selection,
planning and initial implementation of treatments,
in monitoring the progress of therapeutic interven-
tions, and in evaluating if and when recovery has
been achieved. It is therefore essential that clinical
judgements reflect pertinent information about the
individual (Messick, 1980, 1995).
Clinical judgements involve idiographic multi-
faceted, multidimensional conceptualisations of the
unique individual (Korchin & Schuldberg, 1981),
rather than nomothetic analyses of the groups to
which the individual may belong, and about which
probabilistic (statistical) generalisations may be
made (Dawes, 1994). Clinical judgements therefore
require the understanding of an individual’s psychia-
tric profile and the appreciation of his or her unique
environmental contexts (Hoshmand & Polkinghorn,
1992). They are, by definition, based on subjective or
intuitive integrations of often diverse data collected
using a range of methods (including interviews,
observations and projective and objective testing
techniques) that are frequently intended to tap both
conscious and unconscious psychological function-
ing. Sarbin (1986) argued that clinical judgement
provided ‘‘narrative truth’’, a sense of coherence
within the clinical formulation with data used and
combined indirectly to make judgements (p. 362).
Clinical judgements, however, have also been de-
scribed as informal, subjective (Grove & Meehl,
1996; Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, & Nelson, 2000),
and impressionistic (Grove & Meehl, 1996).
Use of the clinical approach places the clinician at
the centre of the psychotherapeutic process, and the
final adequacy of the clinician’s judgement is largely
dependent on his or her knowledge base, his or her
skills in conceptualising, seeking and collecting
relevant, valid and reliable data, and his or her
abilities in integrating and interpreting the complex
array of data that are collected. Therefore, the final
utility of clinical judgement depends on both the
ecological validity of the information collected and
the clinician’s abilities in cue utilisation (Brunswick,
1956; Sawyer, 1966). The clinical approach to
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making judgements, however, is often criticised for
the inexplicit, subjective processes involved in data
integration.
Some opponents of the approach argue that it is
better to combine information using mechanical,
statistical approaches that require little by way of
subjective interpretation, that are absolutely reliable,
and that permit comparisons of the individual with
existing normative data. This statistical approach is
perhaps best exemplified by circumstances in which
judgements are made on the basis of test scores from
standardised, valid and reliable instruments that
specify clear guidelines for data collection and which
produce unambiguous scores that can be combined
in regression equations, which permit conclusions to
be drawn that are based solely on the empirical
relationship between the information and the criter-
ion score. Sarbin (1986) described statistical judge-
ments as providing ‘‘historical truth’’ (p. 362), with
prior conclusions providing optimal weights to
enable probabilistic evaluations (Sarbin, Taft, &
Bailey, 1960). Various alternate terms are used to
specify statistical approaches, including actuarial,
algorithmic (Grove & Meehl, 1996; Grove et al.,
2000), formal, mechanical (Grove & Meehl, 1996),
and psychometric (Korchin & Schuldberg, 1981).
Relative merits of clinical versus statistical
prediction
The Meehl (1954) meta-analysis was seminal to the
debate about the accuracy of clinical versus statistical
prediction. Meehl, a practising clinical psychologist,
was reluctant to accept the Sarbin (1944) argument
that clinicians were unlikely to be able to improve on
statistical techniques for combining data collected in
clinical contexts, and he hoped to demonstrate that
clinical approaches were more accurate in at least
certain situations. Meehl examined 20 contemporary
studies that compared the two methods of predic-
tion, concluding that there was overwhelming
evidence that statistical approaches to prediction
were more accurate than clinical approaches over
many different fields of enterprise using many
different predictive criteria. He reported, for exam-
ple, that academic success was better predicted by a
linear combination of high school rank and aptitude
test scores than by judgements of experienced
university admissions officers, that criminal recidi-
vism was better predicted by past criminal and prison
records than by the judgements of expert criminol-
ogists, and that the success of electroshock treatment
in treating psychosis was better predicted by a
statistical combination of data concerning the
patient’s marital status, the length of psychotic dis-
tress, and level of individual insight than by the judge-
ments of hospital medical and psychological staff.
Given that clinical approaches to decision making
prevailed at the time of the Meehl (1954) study, these
findings caused considerable consternation and, in
fact, they continue to do so more than 50 years later.
But remarkably little has changed in the decision-
making practices of clinical psychologists in response
to the clear empirical evidence. Dawes (1994) argued
that this resistance to change could be understood best
in terms of clinicians protecting professional power
and influence, and progressively moving away from an
historical commitment to the empirical validation of
practice parameters. In addition, Grove and Meehl
(1996) posited that resistances reflect clinicians’ fears
of unemployment due to the refinements in assess-
ment procedures, perceptions of the statistical process
as dehumanising their patients, reluctance to abandon
explanatory theories and, sometimes, poor education
in scientific techniques. This debate is likely to
intensify further given the advent of powerful compu-
ters and increasingly sophisticated programs that can
assist in organising data to make complex decisions
(Einhorn, 1988; Garb, 1998, 2000).
The Meehl (1954) findings have been replicated,
extended and refined many times over the ensuing
years, often through the use of meta-analytic
techniques (e.g., Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989;
Grove et al., 2000; Holt, 1970; Sawyer, 1966). All
except Holt have found statistical methods to be
more accurate. The largest meta-analysis to date was
conducted by Grove et al. and involved 136 studies
comparing the accuracy of clinical and statistical
judgements in relation to human health and beha-
viour, and specifically medical and health diagnoses
and prognoses, and treatment outcomes. The
clinicians whose judgements were examined
included psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers
and others, and education levels ranged from little
above high school level, to an upper bound of the
highly educated medical subspecialists. Results of
the meta-analysis indicated that the accuracy of the
statistical analyses was at least equal to that derived
by clinical methods in up to 94% of cases, and
significantly better in up to 47% of studies. The
overall accuracy of statistical methods was estimated
to be approximately 10% greater than that associated
with clinical approaches despite the fact that clin-
icians often had access to more information. Grove
et al. also reported that the accuracy of judgements
did not reflect characteristics of the predictive
criteria, clinicians’ backgrounds or clinicians’ levels
of education, and they also observed that clinical
judgements were even less accurate when data
considered included clinical interviews. They con-
cluded that because statistical methods were gen-
erally considerably more accurate and were usually
cheaper, their use was to be preferred whenever
relevant algorithms or actuarial data existed.
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Despite the above, the clinician continues to have
much to contribute if only because suitable statistical
formulae or actuarial tables do not exist or are not
sufficiently developed in many fields of psychological
judgement. Consequently, some critics argue that
the central issue is that of enhancing the level of
accuracy of judgements made by any means, rather
than the testing of the relative merits of the two main
approaches to prediction (Holt, 1986; Sawyer, 1966;
Snyder, 2000). Unfortunately, although the debate
over clinical versus statistical prediction may have
achieved a significant degree of theoretical sophisti-
cation, it has largely failed to guide clinicians in
improving their judgement accuracy. Holt (1970,
1986), for example, has strongly advocated the value
of clinical judgement, but has largely failed to
identify how, when, in what context and by whom
such judgements should be made.
It is significant that clinical and statistical
approaches to judgements are not necessarily dis-
tinguished by differences in the types of data sought,
the settings in which judgements are made, the
clinicians who make the judgements or the methods
by which data are collected. The essential distinction
is in the method of data integration: data from
objective tests such as numerical scores can be
clinically combined using informal, subjective meth-
ods, and data from projective tests, interviews and
behavioural observations can be appropriately en-
coded and statistically integrated for comparison
with normative data (Grove & Meehl, 1996).
Some analysts argue that clinical and statistical
approaches cannot be combined or used simulta-
neously because they can lead to inherently contra-
dictory predictions or judgements (Grove et al.,
2000). Examples of circumstances, however, where
combined clinical and statistical approaches are
successful include situations in which computer-
based interpretive systems leave examinees unclassi-
fied or banded into excessively broad categories.
Clinical judgement is necessary to interpret the
individual’s unique responses and to fill the informa-
tion gaps (Vale & Keller, 1987) when checklists are
used to guide clinical data collection (Borum, 1996),
when structured clinical interview procedures are
used, and when clinical decision-making processes
are anchored with base rate information (Harris,
Rice, & Quincey, 1993).
Further, clinical judgement appears to be both
more appropriate and more accurate than statistical
approaches in certain specific situations. Meehl
(1959) argued that the clinician performs a range of
unique and indispensable functions, suggesting that
clinical judgement was essential, for example, when
data resisted explication for statistical prediction and
when explicit prediction rules were yet to be
formulated. Meehl (1973) described several other
situations that favoured the clinician: when tasks
were open ended and not specified in terms of a
criterion dimension, when judgements were
mediated by theory and predictive processes were
therefore not straightforward, and when there was
insufficient time to make decisions based on statis-
tical procedures.
In some circumstances statistical models may exist
but the presence of particular factors may result in
the functional limits of the model being exceeded
(Kleinmuntz, 1990, 1991). Meehl (1954) termed
this ‘‘the broken leg case’’: describing a situation in
which a rare event (e.g., a broken leg) invalidated a
previously valid prediction (e.g., Professor X would
go to the cinema on a particular Friday night). In
such circumstances the clinician could appropriately
countermand decisions arrived at by statistical
methods, although Sawyer (1966) found no evidence
of this and Grove and Meehl (1996) observed that
clinicians’ inconsistencies in applying such decisions
actually resulted in increased error rates. Other
circumstances in which the clinical approach may
be preferred include the earliest phases of patient
contact, when subtleties of behaviour and verbal and
non-verbal cues frequently direct hypothesis forma-
tion (Sawyer, 1966); and when significant data are
described by scores that might otherwise be lost in
data aggregation (Dana, Cocking, & Dana, 1970).
Groth-Marnat (1997) pointed out that interviews are
often the only way to obtain information about
certain behaviours and about unique aspects of
individual histories that tests and statistical formulae
cannot measure, suggesting also that it is not likely
that statistical prediction will ever totally replace
clinical judgement.
Sources of error in clinical judgements
Many clinicians are uncomfortable with findings
suggesting that statistical judgements may be super-
ior to clinical judgement because they appear to
constitute direct challenges to them in terms of their
clinical abilities and their professional relevance.
Some clinicians, however, are able to accept the
challenges tacit in these findings. These clinicians are
willing to examine where the sources of error in their
clinical judgements may lie and thereafter, are able to
minimise the sources of error within their purview.
Indeed, because both statistical and clinical
approaches inevitably lead to at least some level of
judgement error, it is important that clinicians
understand the reasons for the apparent strengths
of statistical approaches and the relative weaknesses
of clinical approaches. Having achieved this, practi-
tioners should be better able to select the best
methods for data collection and integration, and may
be better equipped to control for common factors
114 I. Bell & D. Mellor
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that impact on the accuracy of judgements. What
then are the sources of error in clinical judgement?
Lack of reliability
Although statistical approaches to prediction are not
necessarily accurate, clinical judgements are often so
inaccurate that even very crude statistical tools
outperform them. This was well demonstrated by
Lasky et al. (1959), who observed that the measured
thickness of a patient’s file was as good a predictor of
a patient’s relapse and readmission to psychiatric
care as the opinions of 21 different psychiatric staff.
In fact, Dawes and Corrigan (1974) posited that
statistical approaches were superior even when
regression weights were arbitrary, provided that they
were non-zero, positive and linear, a position
supported by Nisbett and Ross (1980), who argued
that human judges were worse than almost any
regression equations.
These observations suggest that the relative
accuracy of statistical approach to making judge-
ments can be primarily explained in terms of the
reliability. The low reliability of clinical judgements
has been observed in many studies (Faust, 1986).
Even in cases in which the countermanding of
statistical judgements appears to be appropriate, the
unreliability of clinicians’ judgements is so great that
having the opportunity to countermand obvious
judgement errors actually increases total error levels
(Grove & Meehl, 1996; Sawyer, 1966). Indeed, the
relative unreliability of clinical judgements was
highlighted by Goldberg (1991), who observed that
mechanically applying a model based on a clinician’s
judgement was often more accurate over time than
the clinician’s repeated judgements. He explained
this by contrasting the perfect test–retest reliability of
the statistical approach with the relative unreliability
of the clinical approach, whereby repeated judge-
ments using the ‘‘same predictor configurations
[were] often different’’ (p. 179).
Theoretical frameworks
Lack of reliability is reflected in inconsistencies for a
given clinician over time, but also in inconsistencies
in judgements between clinicians. This sometimes
reflects differences in theoretical perspectives: beha-
viourists, for example, emphasise situational deter-
minants, whereas counselling psychologists view
social factors as most salient, humanistic therapists
focus on individuals’ subjective views and experi-
ences and psychoanalysts seek most to understand
conscious and unconscious intra-psychic processes
(Korchin & Schuldberg, 1981). Nisbett and Ross
(1980) argued that these theoretical frameworks
provided ‘‘self-serving’’ motivations that mediate
the clinician behaviours and eventuate in the biased
collection, storage or retrieval of information about
the patient. Similarly, Goldfried (1999) argued that
theoretical schemas were obstacles to efficient
clinical work, encouraging information distortion,
inaccurate gap filling and selective recall of informa-
tion. Therefore it may be that theoretical orientations
provide clinicians with sets of expectations that are
subsequently confirmed by patients in the manner of
self-fulfilling prophecies.
Houts (1984) suggested that lowered reliabilities
that reflect differences in theoretical bases could be
addressed by adequately training clinicians to be
more flexible and more eclectic. Unfortunately,
however, low reliabilities may also reflect other
factors that are not so easily addressed such as
boredom, fatigue, memory failure, or clinicians’
attentional limitations (Einhorn, 1986).
Cognitive heuristics and other sources of bias
In describing successful strategies to use in making
judgements, Dawes and Corrigan (1974) stated,
‘‘ . . . the whole trick is to know what variables to
look at and then to know how to add’’ (p. 105). It
may be more important, however, to know how to
look at the variables because errors in judgement
typically reflect the prejudgements and prejudices
that influence how clinicians perceive the available
data (Garb, 1998). Research has found that people
rarely make judgements relying on the rules of
probability and statistics alone, preferring instead to
use heuristics to reduce the time and effort necessary
to make judgements (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman,
1974, 1982a). But although heuristics are sometimes
accurate and economical, they can also lead directly
to biases and errors of judgement (Nisbett & Ross,
1980). For example, Poland (2004) argued that
many clinicians hold stereotypical views about
schizophrenia, and the invoking of these stereotypes
at any point in the process of engagement with
patients undermines clinical practice to the detri-
ment of both the clinician and the patient. Among
the biases is a tendency to ‘‘observe, attend to,
collect, record, remember, and highlight primarily a
narrow range of information concerning pathologi-
cal, clinically identifiable features (e.g., hallucina-
tions, delusions, bizarre behavior, disorganised
behavior, ‘‘negative symptoms’’)’’ (p. 152).
Perhaps the most comprehensive analysis of
sources of error in the collection, recollection and
integration of data in the context of making clinical
judgements was conducted by Garb (1998). Garb
argued that many errors occurred because of biases
in data collection, reporting that bias in describing
personality or psychopathology, and in diagnosis had
been reliably validated with respect to patient race,
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gender, sex role and age. He also posited the
existence of a bias to over-perceive pathology, which
was built in by the training and experiences of the
clinician (see also Gambrill, 1990; Lopez, 1989;
Shemberg & Doherty, 1999). Clinicians have also
been observed to be biased by labelling effects,
anchoring and adjustment biases (Plous, 1993) when
they are aware of the diagnostic decisions of others
(Langer & Abelson, 1974), and by context effects
(Rosenham, 1973).
Garb (1998) also argued that errors of judgement
could be the result of using faulty and inappropriate
strategies in information processing and integration.
He posited that clinicians tended to be affected by
primacy and recency effects (in which the first and
final information collected assumed disproportionate
salience) that constitute availability biases, where the
information that is most readily accessible or most
easily recalled appears to be more dominant and is
therefore perceived as more probable (Taylor, 1982).
In addition, clinicians are often unduly influenced by
vivid and detailed information, the ease with which
specific examples are drawn to mind, the ease of
visualisation of particular situations or events (Plous,
1993) and by patterns of selective exposure (Dawes,
1994).
Clinicians also show strong confirmatory biases in
seeking, using and remembering information that
supports their hypotheses, and minimising informa-
tion that fails to support, or actually disconfirms, their
hypotheses. Common types involve the perception of
illusory correlations and the mis-estimation of covar-
iance, a tendency to recall instances where two phe-
nomena have covaried rather than to recall those
circumstances where they have not, (Arkes, 1981;
Garb, 1998). Similar biases are noted by Plous (1993),
who pointed out that clinicians do not estimate
probabilities and risks without bias, particularly when
issues involve conditional probability or compound
events. Further, clinicians are often influenced by the
valency of outcomes, perceiving preferred outcomes
as more probable than negative outcomes.
The use of representativeness heuristics also
results in many errors of clinical judgement. Repre-
sentativeness involves judging the probability of an
uncertain event A by judging the degree to which it is
similar to B in essential properties in the parent
population (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973, 1982).
Unfortunately, however, an estimate of the similarity
between events or samples and the population does
not indicate anything specific about its probability
(Dawes, 1994), and this heuristic may lead to the
assignment of high probabilities to detailed proto-
typical combinations of characteristics and the
tendency to assign lower probabilities to single char-
acteristics or events (Snyder, 2000). For example,
Tversky and Kahneman (1982b) illustrated the
representativeness bias in the form of a conjunction
fallacy in a study in which respondents were provided
with a description of Linda, a 31-year-old single,
philosophy major who was interested in issues of
discrimination and social justice, and had partici-
pated in antinuclear demonstrations. In a forced
choice situation, 90% of people defied the rules of
probability, stating that it was more probable that
Linda was a bank teller who was active in the feminist
movement than a bank teller (with no further
elaboration), the probability of which was necessarily
higher than, or at least equal to, the probability of the
alternate option.
A related source of judgement errors is apparent
when clinicians fail to consider relevant base rates
and normative data, particularly when the criterion
event is low frequency and where the frequency of
false identifications associated with a test or diag-
nostic sign exceeds the frequency of the condition
(Faust, 1984, 1986). Related to this heuristic is the
false belief that even in small samples the sampling
distribution will mirror the population distribution
closely (i.e., they will be representative). Tversky and
Kahneman (1971) called this ‘‘belief in the law of
small numbers’’, arguing that its use resulted in
clinicians experiencing unwarranted confidence in
the validity of conclusions based on small samples,
despite the fact that sampling error increased as
sample size decreased.
Limits to information processing abilities
Even when heuristics are not used, other problems
may develop because the demands of information
integration exceed the limits of human information
processing capacity (Kleinmuntz, 1990). This is
particularly the case in relation to the development
of ‘‘multidimensional causal formulations’’ (Snyder,
2000, p. 58). Faust (1984) described cognitive
limitations as ‘‘almost certainly the most basic, most
prevalent, and most troublesome source of human
judgement difficulties’’ (p. 105), suggesting that
many of the potential sources of error described
above may in fact be secondary products of cognitive
limitations. These limits have been highlighted in an
expanding body of research into the relationship
between the amount of information available and
judgement accuracy, and into human abilities in
performance on multiple-cue, complex judgement
tasks. Researchers have indicated that individuals are
apparently incapable of differentially weighting
large quantities of information and that, therefore,
increasing the amount of information available has
not been found to necessarily increase judgement
accuracy (Faust, 1984; Sawyer, 1966). Ironically,
however, many of the defenders of clinical judge-
ment dismiss much of the research into judgement as
116 I. Bell & D. Mellor
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lacking ecological validity, suggesting that real
clinical data are so complex only a human could
possibly process it (Karon, 2000).
Overreliance on the clinical interview
An additional impediment to accurate decision-
making may be the continued emphasis on the
largely unstructured clinical interview as the primary
source of information from which to generate and
explore hypotheses, and to draw conclusions. A
considerable body of research indicates that the
reliability and validity of predictions made on the
basis of unstructured interview data alone are
relatively low. Clinicians have been shown to focus
the interview on issues that will confirm a diagnosis,
or to ignore conflicting evidence (Kendell, 1973;
Simon, Gurland, Fleiss, & Sharpe, 1971). They may
overlook rare or socially embarrassing matters
(Bagley & Genius, 1991; Levine, Ancill, & Roberts,
1989), which is also a serious concern. Further, some
theorists (e.g., Wilson, 1996) argue that the use of
information from the clinical interview in subjective
case formulation can actually reduce the accuracy of
diagnoses below that obtained using replicable,
standardised and manualised assessment tools such
as structured interviews. Darley and Fazio (1980)
suggested that a hypothesis confirmation bias and the
presence of self-fulfilling prophecies contributed
directly to the low levels of predictive accuracy in
interview situations.
Improving clinical judgements
Given that there are diverse sources of error, the
ethical clinician must be vigilant. He or she is obliged
to attempt to maximise the accuracy of any and all of
the clinical judgements made, and should also
consider if statistical approaches may be more
suitable to the circumstances. The final section of
this review addresses the issue of what can be done to
minimise error levels, given that clinical approaches
to making judgements continue to dominate in most
domains of psychological practice, despite the
accrued evidence that indicates the limitations of
the approach.
Expertise, experience and training
Garb (1998) reported that research into the role of
clinician expertise in clinical judgements has led to a
consistent conclusion that experienced and expert
clinicians generally failed to outperform other
clinicians in judgements based on psychological test
information. The same was true when decisions
made by psychologists were compared to those made
by graduate students, although advanced graduate
students were observed to outperform beginning
students. Trained clinicians, however, were generally
more likely to make valid judgements than untrained
lay judges, although this varied somewhat with the
type of task and the nature of the information. In
decisions based on relatively structured materials,
trained clinicians performed significantly better, but
in interpreting projective tests no differences were
observed. Training and experience have also been
found to be relevant to confidence ratings about
decision accuracy, with experienced clinicians being
more able to judge the level of accuracy of their
decisions than less experienced clinicians.
Garb (1998) argued that these unexpected results
reflected the difficulty that clinicians have in learning
from experience because feedback on the accuracy of
decisions is typically inadequate, non-existent,
biased, and/or inaccurate and misleading. He posited
that it is critical that the clinician be skilled at
evaluating the quality and relevance of feedback, and
that he or she be willing to rely on his or her training,
available research findings and/or available mechan-
ical and statistical decision-making aids when no
feedback is available. This may be an appropriate
strategy to use in all cases given that a range of
clinician biases may maintain an ‘‘illusion of learning
from experience’’ (Dawes, 1994, p. 122).
It therefore appears that the amount and quality of
training is relevant to the potential to control for
error, although subsequent levels of experience are of
relatively little relevance. Consequently, Garb (1998)
recommended that clinician accuracy could be
enhanced by vetted graduate student selection, by
specific training in judgement research in graduate
school curricula, by introducing licensing and
accreditation requirements that are relevant to
quality clinical practice, and by the development
and use of many more instructional aids. Similarly,
Nisbett and Ross (1980) argued that education
programs needed to be revised in order to teach
people specifically about inferential processes and
the contrasts between clinical judgement strategies
and other potential approaches.
Using quality instruments and procedures
It is generally taken for granted that reliability and
validity are the cornerstones of good tests and that
well-validated, reliable psychological tests and beha-
vioural assessment methods are often essential in
making accurate judgements. These are typically
anchored in clearly specified test norms and actuarial
base rate data (Garb, 1994; Wedding & Faust,
1989). Garb (1998) suggested that the use of quality
instruments could be further complemented by the
use of cognitive debiasing strategies (e.g., consider-
ing situational factors as well as internal idiographic
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factors) and by decreasing the clinician’s reliance on
memory by better documenting relevant data.
In addition, Garb (1994) and Wedding and Faust
(1989) posited that clinicians should use structured
or semi-structured approaches in interviewing in
order to control for selectivity in data collection.
They suggested that diagnostic decisions should be
carefully linked to formal diagnostic criteria and that
feedback on the accuracy of judgements should
always be sought as a matter of course. Further,
they argued that clinicians must be familiar with
relevant and current theoretical and empirical
literature to inform data collection strategies and to
provide base rate data with which comparisons may
be made.
Being selective
When clinicians use cognitive shortcuts in order to
make tasks more manageable, they often also
increase rates of judgement error. Nisbett and Ross
(1980) pointed out that not all decisions are of equal
importance in terms of consequence, and that
statistical and clinical approaches to making judge-
ments generally differ in terms of the time and effort
required. Therefore they suggested that the best
empirically validated, normative strategies (i.e., using
statistical methods and incorporating actuarial data)
should be used when important judgements were
required, regardless of the time and effort required,
whereas less consequential decisions may appropri-
ately be guided by intuitive strategies and cognitive
heuristics.
Wariness about overreliance on theories
Rabinowitz and Efron (1997) argued that clinicians
collect and evaluate data selectively, choosing a
preferred theory that appears to explain the circum-
stances and then actively seek specific data that
confirm that theory. After collecting a certain
amount of supporting information, they posit, many
clinicians become convinced that the theory they first
selected was indeed the best available and they
therefore often fail to consider other theories that
could account for the symptoms observed. In order
to control for such biases in the diagnostic process
Rabinowitz and Efron suggested that clinicians
should be guided by the following questions: (a)
are the data supporting my emergent diagnosis
reliable and valid, (b) are there other relevant data
that should be collected, (c) are there sufficient data
to arrive at a confident diagnosis, (d) has the
emergent diagnosis been unduly influenced by data
other than the observed and reported behaviour of
the patient, and (e) is the emergent diagnosis the
only one that adequately accounts for the data? They
argue that by using this approach clinicians are more
likely to collect the comprehensive and relevant data
required to arrive at a reasonable diagnosis, and it is
an approach that should assist in any clinical
decision-making context by controlling for biased
impressions and faulty reasoning, and by leading the
clinician to consider a range of possible alternate
diagnoses or explanations.
Turk, Salvoney, and Prentice (1988) and Arnoult
and Anderson (1988) argued that bias could be
reduced by considering multiple explanatory hypoth-
eses for the observed behaviours. Turk et al.
proposed that the clinician should evaluate each
potential explanation for base rate likelihood, but
also in terms of the availability of suitable treatment
methods, the seriousness of consequences if treat-
ments fail, and the relative costs of treating and not
treating. They also suggested that after selecting an
explanatory model for a patient’s behaviour, clin-
icians should justify their selection while actively
seeking disconfirming evidence. Faust (1986) also
argued that the clinician is well advised to remain
conservative in his or her use of data in making
judgements, collecting more if judgements are not
immediately clear.
Scientist–practitioner approach
Improving the quality of clinical judgements requires
the clinician to operate as a scientist–practitioner with
the assumption that attention to correct scientific
technique provides optimal control of error levels.
Thus, Garb (1998) argued that clinicians must attend
to the available empirical evidence rather than to prior
clinical experiences and must actively seek out and
overcome cognitive biases. Further, he recom-
mended that the clinician must be wary of making
judgements in contexts in which prediction is
recognised as difficult, such as in the assessment of
covert phenomena such as suicidality, violent intent
and causation. He also argued that the clinician
should attempt to be systematic, in order to enhance
reliability, and comprehensive, in order to enhance
validity, in collecting and evaluating information.
In selecting and implementing treatments, practi-
tioners should attend to empirically validated
approaches whenever possible, although it is noted
that empirically validated treatments are not recog-
nised for all clinical syndromes, and little efficacy
research has focused on situations where comorbid-
ities exist. Empirically validated treatments may be
classified as ‘‘probably efficacious’’ or as ‘‘well-
established in efficacy’’ (Division 12 Task Force,
1995). Probably efficacious treatments are those that
‘‘ . . . caused a degree of change beyond the amount
of change caused by such factors as the mere passage
of time or the effects of repeated testing’’ and
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treatments that are well-established in efficacy are
those that ‘‘ . . . caused a degree of change beyond
the amount of change caused by factors common to
all therapies’’ (Borkevic & Castonguay, 1998) for
that particular combination of problem, setting, time
and persons. Seligman (1995), however, described
an alternative approach, arguing that randomised
controlled trials were not the only appropriate tests of
therapy quality, and suggested that ‘‘effectiveness’’
studies of how patients fare in the field also yielded
‘‘useful and credible ‘empirical validation’ of
psychotherapy and medication’’ (p. 266). He posited
that efficacy studies ignore the facts that in real
applications (a) therapies are seldom of fixed
duration, (b) they tend to be self-correcting (if one
technique fails another is trialled), (c) they allow for
patient self-selection by therapy shopping, (d) they
include patients with multiple problems, and (e) they
are aimed at providing for improvements in general-
ised functioning rather than specific symptom
amelioration. Effectiveness studies, such as the
Consumer Reports (1995) survey, he suggested, do
not ignore these facts. Therefore, the ethical clinician
needs to consider not only the availability of
empirically validated treatments, but also any avail-
able evidence of prior patient satisfaction.
Reflecting this recent trend of increasing interest in
empirically validated and the more objective practice
of psychotherapy, psychology is moving towards a
new era of integrating empirical evidence with
clinical practice. As mentioned above, in the last
decade, the American Psychological Association
(APA) has been working on building the foundation
for evidence-based practice. Consistent with the
arguments described above, APA defines evidence-
based practice in psychology (EBPP) as ‘‘the integra-
tion of the best available research with clinical expertise
in the context of patient characteristics, culture, and
preferences’’ (APA, 2006, p. 273). The concept is
more relevant in this context than empirically
supported treatments, because EBPP is concerned
with a broader range of clinical activities and processes
including assessment and case formulation.
Furthermore, the definition of EBPP also incor-
porates the importance of patient characteristics that
have been consistently found to influence the
outcome of psychological therapy (Lambert,
Hansen, & Finch, 2001; Lutz et al., 2006; Schulte
& Eifert, 2002; EBPP’s principal components and
recommendations are discussed at length in APA
Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice,
2006). In addition to clinician skills, past research
suggests that certain behaviours of patients (i.e.,
treatment seeking vs. dropping out, high vs. low
cooperation, self-disclosure vs. withdrawal, willing-
ness to explore and experiment with new behaviours
vs. refusal, and the presence of resistance) have
a great impact on the course and outcome of therapy
(Schulte & Eifert, 2002). The degree of the patient’s
pathology/distress as well as comorbidity, and
environmental factors such as the presence or lack
of social support have also been found to influence
the effectiveness of therapy (Beutler, Moleiro, &
Talebi, 2002; Lambert et al., 2001). Thus, in
contrast to previous ‘‘therapy-focused’’ approaches
(i.e., does this therapy work?), more recent studies
have used a ‘‘patient-focused’’ approach (i.e., is this
therapy working for the patient) to explore the course
of therapeutic success for the patients (Lutz et al.,
2006).
Considering the above, it seems reasonable to
assume that psychological practice is becoming more
attuned with existing research, which in turn is also
constantly refined. It appears promising that this
trend will also be translated to the area of clinical
judgment. Indeed, several approaches have been
developed and investigated to augment practising
psychologists in making clinical judgments. For
instance, the systematic treatment selection (STS)
model (Beutler et al., 2002) assists clinicians to plan
an individualised intervention that is based on
research-informed principles that can be applied to
different theories of techniques. Beutler et al. devel-
oped a set of measures to maximise the uniformity of
clinical assessment according to the STS model.
Similarly, Schulte and Eifert (2002) conceived the
dual model of psychotherapy, which takes into
account the importance of patient-related factors
that mediate therapeutic outcomes even when
applying empirically supported treatment. They have
developed comprehensive measures to examine such
patient-related variables as well as to monitor the
therapist’s clinical decision-making process to assist
the assessment, the course, as well as the outcome
of therapy.
Conclusion
There are no magic wands or quick solutions that
provide for an improvement in the accuracy of
clinical judgements. Some approaches to minimising
errors require that the clinician closely scrutinise
hidden elements of his or her decision-making
processes, and many potential solutions to the
problem tend to make the judgement task less
manageable within the practical constraints of
clinical practice. What is clear, however, is that
advanced-level training programs for clinicians are
valuable, particularly where they contain education
about decision-making processes and pitfalls. It is
also obvious that an awareness of potential sources of
judgement error and of the strategies that may be
used to control for them enables clinicians to
make better judgements. This is greatly assisted by
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knowledge of relevant and current empirical re-
search, an awareness of relevant base rates with
which comparisons may be made and by the use of
appropriate reliable and valid instruments in data
collection. Finally, it has been suggested that the
clinician needs to consider practicalities: rigorously
reviewing his or her decision-making processes and
identifying what he or she evaluates to be the most
important contexts in which to use the most careful
of decision-making processes, lest it all becomes
unmanageable. In using the best available methods
to arrive at decisions and to reduce judgement errors,
the clinician is also acting in accord with the ethical
mandates of the profession.
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